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Abstract
In the search for the neural correlate of visual awareness, much controversy exists about the role of primary visual cortex. Here,
the neurophysiological data from V1 recordings in awake monkeys are examined in light of two general classes of models of visual
awareness. In the first model type, visual awareness is seen as being mediated either by a particular set of areas or pathways, or
alternatively by a specific set of neurons. In these models, the role of V1 seems rather limited, as the mere activity of V1 cells seems
insufficient to mediate awareness. In the second model type, awareness is hypothesized to be mediated by a global mechanism, i.e.
a specific kind of activity not linked to a particular area or cell type. Two separate versions of global models are discussed,
synchronous oscillations and spike rate modulations. It is shown that V1 synchrony does not reflect perception but rather the
horizontal connections between neurons, indicating that V1 synchrony cannot be a direct neural correlate of conscious percepts.
However, the rate of spike discharges of V1 neurons is strongly modulated by perceptual context, and these modulations correlate
very well with aspects of perceptual organization, visual awareness, and attention. If these modulations serve as a neural correlate
of visual awareness, then V1 contributes to that neural correlate. Whether V1 plays a role in the neural correlate of visual
awareness thus strongly depends on the way visual awareness is hypothesized to be implemented in the brain. © 2000 Elsevier
Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In the non-dualistic approach to consciousness, vi-
sual awareness is mediated by the activity of nerve cells.
The question that is specifically addressed in this paper,
is to what extent the nerve cells in visual cortical area
V1, or primary visual cortex, contribute to visual
awareness. In discussing the role of V1 in visual aware-
ness I will use the term visual awareness in the same
sense as has been done by Francis Crick and Christof
Koch. They have argued for a relatively loose definition
of the term as long as so little is known about its
nature, neural basis, function, etc. (Crick & Koch,
1998a). Instead of precisely defining the term in psycho-
logical terms and then finding its neural substrate, it
will be better to have insights from psychology and
neurobiology converge towards a unified concept of
visual awareness (Churchland, 1997).
Two important facts set the stage for the present
discussion. First, visual awareness cannot be equated to
visually guided behaviour as such. This becomes most
evident in pathological conditions like blindsight. Here,
patients suffering from a lesion to cortical area V1,
report to be totally unaware of visual stimuli presented
to their blind hemifield, yet are quite capable of guess-
ing correctly about many stimulus attributes. They also
seem little impaired in other visuo-motor behaviour
such as grasping and eye movements to stimuli in the
blind hemifield (Weiskrantz, 1996; Stoerig & Cowey,
1997). Such almost total dissociations between visual
awareness and visually guided behaviour have proven
difficult to demonstrate in normal observers (Kolb &
Braun, 1995). However, it is well known that also in
normal observers, stimuli that are not consciously per-
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ceived can modify subsequent behaviour, as has been
shown in the many experiments on unconscious prim-
ing (Holender, 1986; Merikle, 1992). Moreover, anyone
will have had experiences like driving home while con-
scious thoughts were engaged into something entirely
different. Altogether this clearly implies that visual
awareness can be dissociated from visually guided be-
haviour as such; not all visually guided behaviour is
conscious.
Second, it is clear that not every stimulus that is
picked up by the senses and leads to neural activity,
leads to visual awareness. This is already evident from
the first point, since unconscious visually guided be-
haviour will also be mediated by neural structures. In
classic text books one might still encounter the state-
ment that cortical neurons provide us with the capabil-
ity to ‘become aware’ of what the sensory organs tell
us. We now know, however, that even when a stimulus
evokes cortical activity we do not necessarily become
aware of it. In blindsight, regions of cortex are acti-
vated by stimuli of which the patients are not aware
(Sahraie, Weiskrantz, Barbur, Simmons, Williams &
Brammer, 1997; Stoerig, Kleinschmidt & Frahm, 1998).
But also in normal observers, very interesting findings
bearing on this issue were recently reported using a
semantic priming paradigm. Subjects were shown
masked letter strings of which they were not aware.
These were followed by numbers which the subjects had
to categorize as larger or smaller than five. A classic
priming effect was observed in the sense that the invisi-
ble letter strings (e.g. the word ‘three’) increased or
decreased reaction times depending on whether they
belonged to the same category as the subsequent target
number. The striking observation was that neural activ-
ity related to the unconscious prime could be traced (by
EEG and fMRI methods) up to the motor cortex
issuing the commands for the appropriate categoriza-
tion response (either a left or a right hand lever pull). In
other words, the unconscious stimulus evoked cortical
neural activity in largely the same way as the conscious
stimulus, with mostly quantitative differences (De-
haene, Naccache, Le Clec’H, Koechlin, Mueller, De-
haene-Lambertz, Van de Moortele & Le Bihan, 1998).
These considerations bring us to an important pre-
supposition that can be made in the study of the neural
correlate of visual awareness: some neural activity is
producing visual awareness while other neural activity
is not. Apparently, some neural activity is ‘better’ in
producing visual awareness than other neural activity
and the obvious question thus is what activity falls in
the one or in the other category. This question can be
approached from two rather different perspectives. The
first approach, that we will call the localizationist ap-
proach, tries to answer this question in terms of neural
structures; which parts of the brain (which subcortical
nuclei, which cortical areas) are, and which are not
capable of mediating visual awareness. Or more subtly,
what types of neurons, or for example what layers of
the cortex, mediate awareness. The second approach,
that we will call the global approach, does not try to
answer the question in terms of neural structures but
rather in terms of specific forms of activity. These
specific forms of activity may in principle be mediated
by any neuron in any part of the brain. Whether the
activity mediates awareness is not determined by what
neurons show the activity but rather is an intrinsic
property of the activity. Examples may be synchronous
oscillations in the gamma range, bursts, or specific
modulations of spike rate, as for example also shown in
relation to attention. I will evaluate the role of V1 in
visual awareness from these two rather different
perspectives.
2. The localizationist approach
Before asking whether V1 belongs to the neural
correlate of visual awareness (NCVA), one has to con-
sider what can be meant by stating that the NCVA is or
is not localized in a particular neural structure. The
hallmark of the localizationist approach is the supposi-
tion of the existence of what may be called ‘awareness
dedicated’ neurons. The activity of such neurons, or
groups of neurons, is both necessary and sufficient to
produce awareness of at least some stimulus attribute.
These neurons either reside in special parts of the brain,
the awareness dedicated areas, or belong to a particular
type, say pyramidal cells in some cortical layer. When
these neurons fire we become aware of the visual events
encoded by these neurons. Note, however, that this is
the most extreme form of the localizationist approach,
hardly ever encountered as such. Often it is mitigated in
the sense that the activity of awareness dedicated neu-
rons may lead to awareness (for example depending on
their number, their spike rate, or the co-activation of
some other awareness dedicated neurons), while the
activity of non-awareness dedicated neurons will never
lead to awareness. This is how V1 has been denied a
role in visual awareness (Crick & Koch, 1995, 1998a;
He, Cavanagh & Intriligator, 1996). It has been argued
that the activity of V1 neurons in itself will never lead
to visual awareness, or in other words that V1 does not
possess any awareness dedicated neurons (see below).
How can we decide whether V1 neurons are or are
not dedicated to awareness? We will here address two
methods, lesion studies and neurophysiological record-
ings. The two methods have important caveats but
nevertheless have provided us with the most useful data
until now. The neuropsychological literature on lesions
and their implications for perception and awareness is
vast and has often been excellently reviewed (Farah,
1990, 1997). Here, we will only review some data
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directly relevant to the issue of whether V1 is necessary
and sufficient to mediate awareness. In dealing with
neurophysiological evidence on the relation between V1
activity and awareness we will mostly limit ourselves to
data obtained in awake behaving monkeys, again fo-
cussing on the question whether V1 activity is necessary
and sufficient for visual awareness.
2.1. Cortical lesions and the locus of 6isual awareness
The lesion most relevant to the present discussion is
of course one to V1 itself. When V1 is damaged,
patients are phenomenally blind; they report ‘not seeing
anything’, ‘to have no visual sensation whatsoever’,
‘not being aware of anything happening on that side’,
etc. However, when forced to guess about the location,
form, size, direction of motion or other attributes of the
stimuli that are presented to the blind hemifield, they
often perform well above chance, a phenomenon called
blindsight (Weiskrantz, 1996; Stoerig & Cowey, 1997).
Also in the monkey a behavioural correlate of blind-
sight is found; the animals report to ‘see’ no stimulus,
yet are able to localize them in a forced choice setting
(Cowey & Stoerig, 1995; Moore, Rodman, Repp &
Gross, 1995). Moreover, monkeys with bilateral lesions
to V1 are able to navigate in their environment, pick up
food, and so on (Stoerig & Cowey, 1997). Apparently,
in the absence of V1, vision can still guide behaviour,
while bypassing visual awareness completely. Surpris-
ingly, V1 seems necessary for awareness, but not for all
visually guided behaviour (not to imply that in blind-
sight only awareness is missing and all other visual
behaviour is normal, see Farah, 1997).
Two questions remain; first, does V1 only seem nec-
essary, i.e. is the loss of awareness in fact caused by the
V1 lesion depriving other parts of the brain, the ‘real’
awareness dedicated areas, from their visual inputs;
second, is V1 also sufficient for visual awareness? V1
provides the input to the extrastriate areas and from
there information is transferred either to the parietal
cortex (the dorsal stream) or to the temporal cortex (the
ventral stream). When V1 is lesioned in the monkey, no
visual evoked activity can be recorded any more from
the areas of the ventral pathway, in particular V2, V4,
and IT (Roche-Miranda, Bender, Gross & Mishkin,
1975; Payne, Lomber, Villa & Bullier, 1996; Nowak &
Bullier, 1997). Neurons in area MT, which is part of the
dorsal stream, however, remain responsive, with tuning
characteristics that hardly differ (Rodman, Gross &
Albright, 1989). These responses are probably mediated
by the superior colliculus (SC), since a combined V1
and SC lesion fully abolishes the responses (Rodman,
Gross & Albright, 1990). Also in humans there is
evidence that areas in the parietal lobe are active in
blindsight patients, but whether this occurs also when
stimuli are not consciously perceived is more controver-
sial (Barbur, Watson, Frackowiak & Zeki, 1993; Sto-
erig et al., 1998). An alternative explanation for the V1
lesion resulting in a loss of awareness therefore could be
that the awareness dedicated areas reside somewhere in
the ventral pathway. Indeed some have argued specifi-
cally for the hypothesis that the ventral stream mediates
perception, while the dorsal pathway mediates visually
guided behaviour in the absence of awareness. The
hypothesis is further corroborated by the finding that
strong dissociations exist between action and perception
(Milner, 1995; Milner & Goodale, 1995; see also
Goodale, this volume). To find out, however, whether
ventral stream activity without V1 can mediate aware-
ness, one would have to be able to activate areas in the
ventral stream in the absence of V1, for example by
microstimulation. To date, such experiments have not
been performed.
How about whether V1 is sufficient to produce visual
awareness? Several experiments suggest that this is not
the case. First, lesions to the right parietal lobe may
cause neglect or extinction syndromes (Vallar & Perani,
1986; LaBerge, 1997). This is a complicated family of
disorders (that we will certainly not discuss in detail
here), but a common feature is that either the part of
the hemifield, or the parts of objects that are contralat-
eral to the lesion are not attended to at all (neglect), or
are ignored when ipsilateral stimuli are present (extinc-
tion). The precise relation between attention and aware-
ness is still unknown, but at least the two seem
intimately related (Merikle & Joordens, 1997). In fact,
neglect patients behave as if not aware of the contralat-
eral stimuli (Farah, 1997). Remarkable correspondences
furthermore exist with the blindsight phenomenon: also
in neglect patients, forced choice or priming procedures
can elicit responses to stimuli that are consciously
ignored (Farah, 1997). Similarly, neglected stimuli may
be able to bias responses to, or modify percepts of
attended stimuli (Driver, Baylis & Rafal, 1992; Mattin-
gley, Davis & Driver, 1997). Of course the parietal
lesion in itself does not interrupt the flow of informa-
tion from the retina to V1 (and from thereon to the
ventral areas). Apparently, V1 (or ventral stream) activ-
ity in itself is not sufficient for the stimuli to normally
enter awareness in these patients. Second, Nakamura
and Mishkin (1980) reported that a lesion to all non-vi-
sual cortex in monkeys renders them ‘behaviourally
blind’. The animals were unable to report about visual
stimuli, and it was argued that visual information from
the lesioned hemisphere could, in principle, have been
reported by the animals using the intact connections
from visual cortex to the contralateral hemisphere,
where motor areas were intact. Evoked potentials could
still be recorded from V1 in these animals, showing that
the visual cortex was active. The finding is somewhat
related to the report of a lesion to the extrastriate areas
such that V1 seemed isolated from the rest of the brain
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(Bodis-Wollner, Atkin, Raab & Wolkstein, 1977). Here
also, evoked potentials from V1 could be recorded, yet
the patient was blind.
All in all these findings, although some of them are
difficult to interpret, suggest that visual information
reaching V1 is in itself not sufficient to mediate visual
awareness. V1 is thus not an awareness dedicated area
in the strict sense. Note that in drawing this conclusion
the ventral stream areas are pulled right away with V1
into the same category of non-awareness dedicated
areas, as both in neglect patients and in the non-visual
cortex lesions, the ventral areas are still receiving infor-
mation from V1. As it was already concluded that the
dorsal stream areas cannot mediate visual awareness in
isolation (see above), it thus finally appears, on the
basis of neuropsychological data, that none of the
visual areas, V1, extrastriate, dorsal or ventral stream,
are both necessary and sufficient for visual awareness.
2.2. Neurophysiology and the locus of 6isual awareness
An second important way of investigating the NCVA
is to estimate to what extent neural activity is correlated
with perception. Unmistakenly, in V1, activity can be
recorded in response to stimuli or stimulus aspects of
which we are not aware. Examples exist both in the
temporal as in the spatial frequency domain. High
frequency (50 Hz) flickering luminance stimuli evoke
responses from V1 in experimental animals (Wollman
& Palmer, 1995) as well as in humans (Maier, Dagnelie,
Spekreijse & Van Dijk, 1987). However, these stimuli
are perceived as being of constant brightness, due to the
fact that the perceptual flicker fusion frequency is well
below 50 Hz. A somewhat related finding is made in
relation to colour perception. When two isoluminant
colors alternate at frequencies above 10 Hz, one non-
flickering (fused) color is perceived that is a mixture of
the two component hues. However, cells in the color
blobs of V1 respond to the component flicker well
above 10 Hz (Gur & Snodderly, 1997). Neurons in V1
furthermore respond to grating patterns of very fine
spatial scale (Foster, Gaska, Nagler & Pollen, 1985).
This might even occur for gratings that are perceived as
homogenous grey surfaces, as humans adapt to the
orientation of those gratings even when this orientation
is not perceived (He, Smallman & MacLeod, 1995; He
et al., 1996). Thus in all these cases there is an aspect of
the stimulus that is detected by the V1 neurons, yet that
is not perceived.
When random dot patterns are presented in stereo-
scopic viewing, the pairing of dots presented to the two
eyes results in a depth percept. For example, random
dot pairs that are presented at a disparity that is
different from surrounding dot pairs will readily pop-
out from the surround. It has been shown that V1
neurons are tuned to disparity, and this begs the ques-
tion whether this tuning to disparity is related to depth
perception or not. This was investigated using anti-cor-
related dot pairs. Here the dot pairs presented to the
two eyes have opposite colors (black versus white). As
a result, depth perception is lost. However, V1 neurons
seem to be equally well tuned for the disparity of
anticorrelated as for the disparity of normal stereo
random dot stimuli (Cumming & Parker, 1997). The V1
tuning to disparity thus bears no direct relation to
depth perception.
When two differently oriented gratings are presented
to the two eyes, the phenomenon of rivalry is observed;
subjects perceive either the one or the other grating,
and this percept typically changes every few seconds,
while the stimulus remains unchanged. Two persons
looking at the same rivalry stimulus at the same mo-
ment in time might perceive different gratings, and in
that sense, the rivalry phenomenon offers a window on
‘subjective’ aspects of how a stimulus is perceived.
Recordings were made in the visual cortex of monkeys
that were asked to report their percepts by behavioural
means. Many neurons in all areas recorded from (MT,
V4, V2, V1) respond to the grating whether it is per-
ceived or not. The response of a percentage of cells,
however, is influenced by which of the two stimuli is
perceived. This percentage is higher (ca 40%) in higher
areas (MT and V4) than in lower areas (V1:V2: ca 20%)
(Logothetis & Schall, 1989; Leopold & Logothetis,
1996). Cells in infero-temporal cortex respond in an
almost all or nothing fashion to stimuli that are per-
ceived or suppressed in a flash-suppression rivalry
paradigm (Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997).
In summary, many cells in V1 respond to stimulus
attributes of which we are not aware, or in other words,
many V1 cells are non-awareness dedicated neurons;
their activity does not suffice for the percept of the
‘invisible’ stimulus attributes they encode. Of course
that does not exclude the possibility that other V1
neurons do show activity that is correlated to percep-
tion and whose activity might be sufficient for that
percept. The rivalry experiments show that at least the
activity of a small proportion of the cells correlates
with what stimulus is perceived. Also, much of the
activity of V1 neurons under normal stimulus condi-
tions is obviously in response to stimulus attributes that
we do perceive. The question that still remains to be
solved is whether this activity is sufficient for visual
awareness. Until proven otherwise, the most straight-
forward conclusion is that V1 does not possess any
awareness dedicated neurons.
3. A global approach to visual awareness; two
candidate substrates
In opposition to the localizationist approach to the
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NCVA one finds the global approach. The hallmark
of this approach is that the NCVA is not linked to a
particular neural structure, but rather to a specific
kind of neural activity. In principle this NCVA re-
lated neural activity can be mediated by any neural
structure, depending on the actual content of aware-
ness. Also the global approaches are hardly ever ad-
vocated in the most extreme form; usually the neural
structures mediating the NCVA related activity are
somehow restricted, for example to the cerebral cor-
tex. I will here investigate the role of V1 activity with
respect to two kinds of candidate global NCVA’s,
synchronous oscillations and amplitude modulations.
3.1. Neuronal synchrony
Synchronous oscillatory neural activity in the
gamma range (ca 30–80 Hz) has been proposed as a
neural correlate of conscious perceptual organization
(Von der Malsburg & Schneider, 1986; Singer &
Gray, 1995), or even consciousness in general (Crick,
1994). Synchrony would be a typical example of a
global NCVA; at some time neurons may synchronize
their activity, while at some other time may be desyn-
chronized, depending on what neurons form dynamic
assemblies to represent particular perceptual or motor
output events. The representation of a specific con-
scious event would be at the level of the neuronal
assembly (neurons linked by synchrony), not so much
at the level of the individual neurons themselves
(Edelman, 1992). In the realm of visual perception,
individual neurons would only represent individual
features of a visual scene, while the synchrony would
represent which features group together to form ob-
jects.
In support of the hypothesis is that gamma type
activity is suppressed under anaesthesia (Kulli &
Koch, 1991), and increases under conditions of per-
ceptual or attentional load (Tallon-Baudry &
Bertrand, 1999). However, coherent gamma oscilla-
tions have been found in the anaesthetized animal as
well (Eckhorn, Bauer, Jordan, Brosch, Kruse, Munk
& Reitboeck, 1988; Gray, Engel, Ko¨nig & Singer,
1989; Engel, Ko¨nig & Singer, 1991; Singer & Gray,
1995). Synchrony in the gamma range also increases
when the reticular formation is stimulated (Munk,
Roelfsema, Ko¨nig, Engel & Singer, 1996). Gamma
activity may thus represent a general state of arousal,
not directly linked to consciousness. Moreover, it is
important to distinguish between gamma range oscil-
lations and synchrony per se. High frequency oscilla-
tions may primarily serve to facilitate the occurrence
of synchrony, particularly over larger distances
(Ko¨nig, Engel & Singer, 1995). Synchrony may reflect
neuronal group formation also in the absence of oscil-
latory activity, and it has been proposed that coherent
activity at very different time scales may in fact sup-
port the same goal (Roelfsema & Singer, 1998).
What has been studied mostly is the relation be-
tween synchrony and grouping criteria of perceptual
organization (Eckhorn et al., 1988; Gray et al., 1989;
Engel et al., 1991; Freiwald, Kreiter & Singer, 1995;
Kreiter & Singer, 1996; Livingstone, 1996; Brosch,
Bauer & Eckhorn, 1997). For example, it was found
that line segments of the same orientation cause cells
in V1 to synchronize their activity more than line
segments of dissimilar orientation (Ts’o, Gilbert &
Wiesel, 1986; Engel et al., 1991; Livingstone, 1996).
At the same time it is known that similarity is a
strong grouping factor in perceptual organization. In
this way, it has been established that synchrony corre-
lates with the grouping criteria of connectedness,
proximity, similarity (common orientation, common
direction of motion), and collinearity (Singer & Gray,
1995). What has been less well studied is the relation
between synchrony and whether the percepts were
processed consciously, or inside the focus of attention,
or for example preattentively etc. In fact, many of the
experiments were performed on anaesthetized animals,
yet a correlate between synchrony and the grouping
criteria was still found. An important exception is the
study of Fries, Roelfsema, Engel, Ko¨nig and Singer
(1997); here it was found that synchrony in the awake
cat depended strongly on the dominating percept in a
binocular rivalry paradigm.
An important issue is whether synchrony indeed rep-
resents the grouping of features in perceptual organiza-
tion, or rather reflects the direct anatomical connections
between neurons that lay the foundations for such
groupings. This is a subtle but important difference that
we will explain somewhat further. In Fig. 1, putative
receptive fields of two low level, say V1, neurons are
shown, that are stimulated with bars. In the leftmost
constellation (a) the two bars belong to the same obejct,
while in the middle constellation; (b) the two bars
belong to two different objects that segregate from each
other. If synchrony between these neurons would repre-
sent perceptual grouping, a cross-correlation of the
spike discharges of the two neurons would have to
show strong differences; a higher peak in the correlo-
gram for the homogenous texture stimulus than for the
segregating stimulus (see hypothetical correlograms
next to label ‘perception’). However, we also know that
in V1, cells are connected via horizontal fibers that
preferentially exist between cells with similar orienta-
tion tuning (Ts’o et al., 1986; Gilbert & Wiesel 1989;
Malach, Amir, Harel & Grinvald, 1993). On the basis
of this alone, we also expect a similar difference in
synchrony (see correlograms next to label ‘horizontal
connections’). The comparison between (a) and (b)
therefore does not discriminate between whether syn-
chrony reflects perceptual organization or intrinsic V1
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connections. A comparison between stimuli (b) and (c)
however will discriminate between the two alternatives.
Here different outcomes in synchrony are expected
depending on whether synchrony represents perceptual
organization or anatomical connections. From the
point of view of horizontal connections, low synchrony
is expected for both stimuli, since there is a consider-
able orientation difference between the two stimuli. But
as the two line segments belong to a perceptual group
in (c), higher synchrony is expected in (c) than in (b)
from the perceptual point of view.
This exact experiment has never been performed, but
we did something similar. Synchrony between V1 neu-
rons was studied while monkeys were viewing oriented
texture displays like the ones shown in Fig. 2(a). The
animals reported segregation (i.e. identified the figure
from background) both for the 90 and the 20° orienta-
tion difference (and of course not for the 0° difference);
figures were detected in 89, 89, and 0% of the presenta-
tions, respectively. However, synchrony recorded be-
tween neurons on either side of the boundary between
figure and background reflected the orientation differ-
ence rather than the percept, i.e. was high for the 0 and
20° orientation difference and lower for the 90° differ-
ence (Fig. 2b). Also for textures segregating on the
basis of motion differences no difference in synchrony
was found between segregating or non-segregating stim-
uli (Lamme & Spekreijse, 1998a). These results clearly
demonstrate that the synchrony between neurons in V1
reflect the horizontal connections between cells, irre-
spective of the outcome of the segregation process.
Also in the early studies using cross-correlation anal-
ysis of neuronal activity, synchrony was mainly re-
garded as reflecting the anatomical connections
between recording sites (Ts’o et al., 1986; Gilbert &
Wiesel, 1989; Kru¨ger & Aiple, 1989). Experiments on
the stimulus specificity of neuronal synchrony suggested
that in addition to representing anatomical connections,
synchrony was reflecting dynamical associations be-
tween neurons that represented features that were per-
ceptually combined into coherent objects (Gray et al.,
1989; Engel et al., 1991; Freiwald et al., 1995; Kreiter &
Singer, 1996; Livingstone, 1996; Brosch et al., 1997).
Most well known is the ‘long bar’ experiment. In this
experiment, it was found that synchronous oscillations
between two recording sites were stronger when a single
bar co-stimulated the two sites than when two sepa-
rately moving bars stimulated the sites. The synchrony
was weakest when the two separate bars moved in
opposite directions (Gray et al., 1989). Closely related is
the experiment of Brosch et al. (1997), using moving
gratings instead of bars. But also in these experiments
Fig. 1. Three stimuli that can dissociate effects on synchrony. Line segments stimulate two receptive fields (RF’s, dotted circles). In stimulus (a)
the RF’s are stimulated with identical orientations, while in stimuli (b) and (c) the RF’s are stimulated with different orientations. When synchrony
reflects horizontal connections, that connect cells with similar orientation tuning, cross-correlograms are low for (b) and (c), and high for (a).
However, when synchrony transcends the local information, and reflects the perceptual interpretation of the scene, synchrony should be high for
both (a) and (c), where the line segment group into a homogenous texture, and low for (b), where the line segments belong to different parts of
the scene. cccross correlation.
V.A.F. Lamme et al. : Vision Research 40 (2000) 1507–1521 1513
Fig. 2. Synchrony does not, while amplitude modulations do reflect figure–ground segregation in a cue-invariant way. (a) Three orientation
differences between a central square and its surround, where both the 20 and the 90° orientation difference result in figure–ground segregation.
(b) Synchrony between neurons (whose RF’s are shown in (a), is only lower for the 90° orientation difference, and equally high for the 20° as for
the 0° (no segregation) condition. Synchrony thus reflects orientation differences rather than segregation. White parts of histograms give the SEM
values. (c) Response amplitudes for the cells with RF1. Both the 20 and the 90° orientation difference give an enhanced response compared with
the 0° diference (difference shown as gray shading), signalling the figure–ground segregation rather than the orientation difference.
there is a confound between local (horizontal) connec-
tions as such and perceptual grouping. The results can
equally well be explained on the basis of connections
that depend on distance and orientation selectivity as
on the basis of Gestalt laws of grouping: when a long
continuous bar is moved, activity of sites representing
the bar can spread through local connections from the
one end to the other. When two bars move, separated
by some gap, the spreading is obstructed by having to
transcend a corresponding piece of cortex that is not
active. A reduction of synchrony is observed (Gray et
al., 1989). When the two bars move in opposite direc-
tions, the distance between the two bars is on average
even larger, and synchrony reduces further. This inter-
pretation is corroborated by the grating experiment of
Brosch et al. (1997). Here, synchrony is reduced when a
gap is introduced between two grating fields moving in
the same direction, but not further reduced when the
two gratings are also moving in opposite directions
(which in this case, contrary to the moving bar, does
not on average increase the area of intervening not
active cortex). Sadly, the complementary experiment of
having the two gratings move in opposite directions
without a gap was not performed.
There is also other evidence showing that synchrony
depends largely on the architecture of direct cortico-
cortical connections (Ts’o et al., 1986; Roelfsema, En-
gel, Ko¨nig & Singer, 1997). For example, in strabismic
cats there is a reduced synchronization between neu-
rons dominated by different eyes (Ko¨nig, Engel, Lo¨wel
& Singer, 1993; Roelfsema, Ko¨nig, Engel, Sireteanu &
Singer, 1994), which is accompanied by a reduction of
connections between different ocular dominance
columns (Lo¨wel & Singer, 1992). That synchrony
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reflects the dominant percept in binocular rivalry (Fries
et al., 1997), cannot easily be explained on the basis of
intrinsic V1 connections.
With that one exception, the most parsimonious in-
terpretation of almost all the data seems to be that
synchrony in V1 reflects the anatomical connections
within V1. Neurons are connected on the basis of
distance, orientation tuning and collinearity. Only these
factors influence synchrony, irrespective of whether the
grouping criteria of proximity, similarity and good
continuation contribute to the perceptual organization
of the scene. One could argue that these connections,
and thus the synchrony, lay the initial foundations for
the process of perceptual organization, on which higher
areas then could further elaborate. This implies, how-
ever, that synchrony in V1 does not represent the final
outcome of the process of perceptual organization; in
other words, the ‘results’ of these further elaborations
are not fed back to V1 to update the V1 synchrony. In
conclusion, there is very little support for the hypothe-
sis that V1 synchrony is part of the NCVA.
3.2. Modulations of firing rate
A second type of global NCVA would be that visual
awareness is expressed in the rate of firing of action
potentials of neurons. This would be a correlate of
awareness that has many similarities with the correlate
of visual attention. It has been shown that in many
areas of the visual cortex, including V1, the rate of
firing is influenced by whether stimuli are attended to
or not (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). This is now gener-
ally accepted as the neural correlate of attention. Atten-
tion and awareness are intimately interrelated,
suggesting that the neural correlates of both may over-
lap substantially (Posner, 1994; Block, 1996). But aside
from that, the correlate of awareness as such might
equally well be a modulation of firing rate. In other
words, whether stimuli reach awareness or not modu-
lates the rate of firing of cells responding to those
stimuli. To what extent is there evidence that V1 activ-
ity is indeed a mixture of activity that reflects non-
awareness related processing and activity that have a
relation to perception?
In contextual modulation, the responses of a cell to a
stimulus in its receptive field are influenced by sur-
rounding stimuli. These surrounding stimuli are by
themselves not capable of stimulating the cell, but may
modulate its firing rate when a receptive field (RF)
stimulus is present. The surrounding stimuli may either
inhibit or enhance responses to the RF stimulus, de-
pending on the relative characteristics of both RF and
surround stimulus. This has been reviewed elsewhere
(Allman, Miezin & McGuiness, 1985; Lamme &
Spekreijse, 2000). For the present discussion two as-
pects of contextual modulation are important; its close
relation to perceptual organization and its timing.
It appears that contextual modulation is not merely a
type of ‘surround inhibition’ but expresses the percep-
tual interpretation of the elements that make up a
scene. Contextual modulation in V1 expresses percep-
tual pop-out (Knierim & Van Essen, 1992; Kastner,
Nothdurft & Pigarev, 1997; Nothdurft, Gallant & Van
Essen, 1999). Moreover, more global factors that deter-
mine perceptual grouping and segregation of line seg-
ments, like for example shown in Fig. 1, likewise
influence contextual modulation effects in V1 (Kapadia,
Ito, Gilbert & Westheimer, 1995; Polat, Mizobe, Pettet,
Kasamatsu & Norcia, 1998). Figure–ground segrega-
tion, i.e. whether line segments are interpreted as be-
longing to the figure surface or the background surface,
is expressed under a variety of circumstances (Lamme,
1995; Zipser, Lamme & Schiller, 1996; Lee, Mumford,
Romero & Lamme, 1998). Figures can segregate from
background on the basis of differences in orientation
(Fig. 2), motion, disparity, colour, or luminance, and
contextual modulation expresses figure–ground segre-
gation for all these cues (Lamme, 1995; Zipser et al.,
1996). Fig. 2(c) shows how contextual modulation sig-
nals the figure–ground relationships irrespective of the
orientation difference; both the 90 and the 20° orienta-
tion difference evoke a similar amount of modulation
(where synchrony only ‘signals’ segregation for the 90°
orientation difference). Changing the luminance or
colour of the background of a coloured square induces
a change in the perceived brightness or colour of that
(unchanged) square. This is also reflected in the modu-
lation of V1 responses (Rossi, Rittenhouse & Paradiso,
1996; MacEvoy & Paradiso, 1999; Wachtler, Sejnowski
& Albright, 1999). In summary, thus, it appears that
contextual modulation in V1 expresses the perceptual
interpretation of elements in a scene for a wide variety
of conditions.
Contextual modulation takes a wide range of times
to express itself. Once the cells start to respond, the
effects can either occur immediately or only after some
latency. The latency of the effects seems to depend on
the complexity of the computations underlying the
modulation and the spatial extent of the part of the
scene that is taken into consideration : the suppressive
effect that arises from presenting a stimulus in the
immediate surround of a receptive field stimulus takes
very short to develop. No latency difference (Mu¨ller,
Krauskopf & Lennie, 1997), or a latency difference of
only 7 ms have been reported (Knierim & Van Essen,
1992). Orientation specific effects, i.e. comparing the
effect of an identical background with that of a orthog-
onal background producing perceptual pop-out, take
about 20 ms (Knierim & Van Essen, 1992).
Lamme, Rodriguez and Spekreijse (1999) studied
how various aspects of a textured figure–ground stimu-
lus are expressed in the responses of V1 cells at differ-
ent times. This is shown in Fig. 3. At 30 ms after
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stimulus onset the response starts. By comparing re-
sponses to textures of different orientations, it can be
shown that after 50 ms, orientation tuning (for textures)
is expressed by the cells. At around 80 ms, response
components emerge that are specifically generated by
the figure–ground boundary, consisting of abutting
terminated line segments of orthogonal orientation. At
100 ms, an enhancement of the response is found that
signals the figure–ground relationship of the surface
features that cover the RF. At even later moments in
time, neuronal responses in V1 express whether a stimu-
lus is attended to or not: Landman, Lamme and
Spekreijse (2000) showed that when multiple figures
segregating from background are shown, the initial
phase of the figure–ground modulation did not depend
on the number of objects, while at later moments in
time (\200 ms) a relation was found between the
strength of modulation and the number of objects in
the scene. This suggests that the initial part of the
modulation is purely preattentive while at later stages
attentive components might emerge. This is line with
earlier experiments showing attentional modulation at
235 ms (Fig. 3b, Roelfsema, Lamme & Spekreijse,
1998).
V1 neurons thus express different aspects of visual
processing at different times, ranging from simple re-
ceptive field based processing up to aspects of fully
evolved perceptual organization (see also Roelfsema et
Fig. 3. V1 cells are sequentially selective for various aspects of a stimulus. (a) Comparing responses of V1 cells to differently oriented textures
(right coulmn, top graph, gray shading indicates difference) shows that cells are selective for orientation of textures at 55 ms (arrow indicates
moment of first significant difference). The same cells are selective for the boundary between figure and ground (second graph from top) at 80 ms,
and show an enhanced response when the RF covers the figure surface compared with the background surface at 100 ms (Lamme et al., 1999).
(b) V1 cells show an enhanced response when they respond to an attended curve passing through the receptive field (RF), compared with a
non-attended curve. This difference occurs at 235 ms after stimulus onset (Roelfsema et al., 1998).
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Fig. 4. (a) Orthogonal textures presented to the two eyes, each containing a figure on a background yield a cyclopean percept of a homogenous
texture, with no visible figure (at excentric fixation). (b) When the figure is present in one eye only, the cyclopean percept is that of a figure on
a background. The stimulus in (b) yields figure–ground related contextual modulation, the stimulus in (a) does not (Zipser et al., 1996).
al., this volume). Could it be that at some time, these
neurons even express visual awareness? There are sev-
eral converging pieces of evidence that indicate that this
might very well be the case. First, there are stimulus
manipulations that have strong effects on whether stim-
uli are perceived or not, and these seem to effect late
onset modulations in particular. We did an experiment
that was inspired by the stimuli used by Kolb and
Braun to demonstrate blindsight in normal observers
(Kolb & Braun, 1995). When two figure–ground dis-
plays with orthogonal orientations are presented each
to one of the two eyes, the fused Cyclopean percept is
that of a homogenous texture with no figure present in
it (Fig. 4a). When one eye is presented with a homoge-
nous texture and the other eye with a figure–ground
display, the figure is visible (Fig. 4b). The latter stimu-
lus evokes contextual modulation signalling the pres-
ence of the figure, but the former stimulus does not
(Zipser et al., 1996); so while the figures are present in
either eye alone the modulation signals the percept (no
figure present) rather than this information. These find-
ings may furthermore be associated with the results of
Bridgeman (1980). He recorded from V1 neurons in
awake monkeys while presenting stimuli that were
masked using meta-contrast masking. The animals re-
ported the masking behaviourally. The early responses
of the V1 neurons (up to 110 ms) were not affected by
the masking, but late responses (after 110 ms) were
inhibited by the masking, signalling the reduced visibil-
ity of the stimuli covering the receptive field (Bridge-
man, 1980). A third example comes from the random
dot patterns that evoke a depth percept when lumi-
nance correlated dot pairs are used, while no depth
percept is evoked when anti-correlated dots are used.
V1 neurons are equally well tuned to both of them,
suggesting no role of the V1 depth responses in depth
perception. However, when response amplitude is con-
sidered, it appears that the correlated dots produce
about twice the response of the anti-correlated dots
(Cumming & Parker, 1997). Depth perception rather
than disparity as such thus has an influence on the V1
responses.
Of course the above examples are still manipulations
of the stimuli rather than of visual awareness. A (rather
crude) way of manipulating awareness is anaesthesia.
While receptive field tuning properties of V1 neurons
are little or not affected by anaesthesia (Schiller, Finlay
& Volman, 1976; Snodderly & Gur, 1995), contextual
modulation is affected by anaesthesia to different de-
grees. Short latency modulations, evoked by surround
stimuli that may exert their effects through local or
horizontal connections within V1, can be recorded in
awake as well as anaesthetized animals (Knierim & Van
Essen, 1992; Kapadia et al., 1995; Kastner et al., 1997;
Polat et al., 1998). However, modulations reflecting
perceptual pop-out are stronger in awake than in anaes-
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thetized animals (Nothdurft et al., 1999). Finally, con-
textual modulation related to figure–ground segrega-
tion is fully suppressed by anaesthesia (Lamme, Supe`r
& Spekreijse, 1998b). The latter type of modulation
seems to depend strongly on feedback from extrastriate
areas (Lamme, Zipser & Spekreijse, 1998c). It seems as
if the longer information has to ‘travel’ over the net-
work of local, horizontal, and feedback connections to
evoke the modulatory effects, the more susceptible
these effects are to anaesthesia.
Anaesthesia will not only affect visual awareness but
probably many other processes as well. A more direct
link to visual awareness would only be established
when a trial by trial comparison of perceived versus not
perceived stimuli, that are otherwise identical, is per-
formed. This was recently done by using figure–ground
displays like shown in Fig. 2. Contextual modulation
was recorded in monkeys that had to report whether
the figure was perceived or not. This was done in a
manner very similar to the one used to demonstrate
that monkeys do not ‘perceive’ stimuli in blindsight
(Moore et al., 1995). Catch-trials, in which no figure
was present at all, were presented in combination with
figure-present trials, where a figure appeared at one of
three possible locations. The animal’s task was to indi-
cate the position of the figure, when present, by making
a saccadic eye movement towards it. On catch-trials,
the animal was rewarded when it remained fixating.
The key feature of the paradigm is that when for some
reason the figure in a figure-present trial is not per-
ceived, the monkey will signal this by maintaining
fixation. Neural responses recorded during figure-
present trials that resulted in a correct saccade were
compared with responses from figure-present trials that
were classified as figure-absent (catch-trial) by the mon-
key. Figure–ground related contextual modulation was
strongly reduced or absent in the case the monkey did
not perceive the figure (Supe`r, Lamme & Spekreijse,
1999). In other words, contextual modulation only
reflects the figure–ground relationships when these are
(consciously) perceived by the animal.
Further evidence in the same direction comes from
experiments that show that V1 responses are influenced
by how ambiguous stimuli are perceived. As already
mentioned, some 20% of V1:V2 cells are influenced by
perceptual switches in binocular rivalry (Leopold &
Logothetis, 1996). Likewise, it was shown that the
responses of V1 neurons (Grunewald, Bradley & An-
dersen, 1999), just like MT neurons (Bradley, Chang &
Andersen, 1998), are influenced by the perceived direc-
tion of rotation of a random dot cylinder whose rota-
tion, clockwise or counter-clockwise, is perceptually
ambiguous.
In summary, the responses of V1 cells indeed appear
to be a mixture of activity that is not related to
perception, and activity that correlates with aspects of
perceptual organization, attention, and visual aware-
ness. Early response components are mostly related to
receptive field based processing, far dissociated from
perception, while late components of the V1 responses
are correlated with conscious perceptual interpretations
of the scene.
4. Conclusions
Here we will summarize several conclusions that have
been drawn above on the basis of the neuropsychologi-
cal, neurophysiological and other data.
1. V1 is not an awareness dedicated area
It is evident that V1 is not an awareness dedicated
area in the sense that the activity of its neurons is
necessary and sufficient to produce a conscious percept.
This conclusion can be drawn from neuropsychological
as well as from neurophysiological data; In other
words, when V1 neurons fire we do not automatically
become aware of the information that is conveyed by
these neurons. So within the framework of the localiza-
tionist approach to the NCVA, the role for V1 seems
rather limited.
In this respect, however, V1 seems hardly different
from the other visual areas. The neuropsychological
findings discussed above showed that in fact none of
the visual areas, be it V1, the extrastriate areas, or any
other high level area in the dorsal or ventral stream
alone is sufficient to produce visual awareness.
2. Synchrony in V1 is not a correlate of perceptual
organization
To date, there is still very little evidence that syn-
chrony in V1 represents the final ‘outcome’ of the
process of perceptual organization, let alone whether
we are aware of this outcome. Many experiments show
a relation between synchrony and rules of perceptual
organization, but without dissociating it from a relation
between synchrony and intrinsic V1 connections. Some
results suggest that synchony might go beyond intrinsic
V1 connections and signal what is perceived (Fries et
al., 1997), while other results suggest the very opposite,
that synchrony in V1 reflect the intrinsic connections
irrespective of how a scene is perceived (Lamme &
Spekreijse, 1998a).
3. V1 neurons express different aspects of 6isual pro-
cessing at different times
The activity of V1 cells represents local receptive field
based processing at short latencies after stimulus onset,
but at longer latencies represents various aspects of
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perceptual organization, which we call contextual mod-
ulation. Finally, V1 activity may reflect whether stimuli
are attended to or not. Also in this respect, V1 seems to
be hardly different from other cortical areas. In parietal
cortex, for example, it is found that neurons may
represent aspects of the visual stimulus as well as
activity related to saccadic eye movements targeted at
these stimuli, and whether stimuli are attended to or
not (Colby, Duhamel & Goldberg, 1996). This may not
be considered very surprising for a cortical region that
is clearly situated between sensory and executive space
and that is known to play an important role in the
transformation of information from retinal to motor
coordinate frames (Andersen, Snyder, Li & Stricanne,
1993; Andersen, Snyder, Bradley & Xing, 1997; Colby,
1998). However, also at the other extreme end of the
brain, in primary motor cortex, it is found that early
responses in a sensorimotor task are reflecting the
sensory events, while late responses are mostly reflect-
ing the motor commands that conclude the task. At
intermediate latencies, responses are reflecting interme-
diate stages of processing related to the specific sensori-
motor mapping rules that apply to the task (Zhang,
Riehle, Requin & Kornblum, 1997). In the frontal eye
fields of prefrontal cortex, similar findings have been
reported with respect to eye movements. Different types
of neurons have been identified; visual neurons, and
pre-saccade neurons (Schall & Thompson, 1999). Visual
neurons may reflect different stages of the visuo-motor
transformation at different moments in time. In a task
where monkeys had to select the odd item amongst a
set of distractors, the visual response up to 120 ms did
not differentiate between target and distractors. After
120–150 ms, however, the visual neurons had a much
larger response to targets than to distractors (Thomp-
son, Hanes, Bichot & Schall, 1996; Schall & Bichot,
1998).
That neurons at one moment may be engaged in
sensory processing while at another moment may be
involved in the neural processes generating a be-
havioural response has an important consequence for
the search for the NCVA; when some part of the
activity of an area or even a cell has been proven not to
correlate with awareness this never logically warrants
the conclusion that the cell is not part of the NCVA. It
might very well be, just at some other moment in time.
To exclude a neuron from the NCVA it would have to
be shown that it is not at any time correlated with
awareness, in any kind of visual task. This is obviously
an impossible enterprise.
4. Some part of V1 acti6ity reflects 6isual awareness
We have seen that a percentage of V1 cells may
reflect the reported percept in rivalry experiments or in
experiments using ambiguous motion stimuli. Also,
contextual modulation for figure–ground displays only
occurs when the animal reports to be aware of the
figure. There are some noteworthy similarities in this
respect with neural correlates of visual awareness that
have been recorded in prefrontal cortex. Neural activa-
tion in the frontal eye field was studied in relation to
the detection of masked stimuli (Thompson & Schall,
1998, 1999; this volume). It was shown that visual
neurons in the early parts of their response exhibit
activity that ‘predicts’ whether the monkey will detect
the target. Moreover, components of the response after
about 100 ms correlate with whether the monkey iden-
tifies the stimulus as a target or not. There are several
reasons to argue that this late activity is not a correlate
of the eye movement associated with the target identifi-
cation but rather is a correlate of the conscious visual
selection process leading to the distinction between
targets and non-targets (Thompson and Schall, this
volume).
Prefrontal cortex projects back to extrastriate visual
areas (Salin & Bullier, 1995), and there is evidence that
contextual modulation in V1 depends on feedback (Bul-
lier, Hupe´, James & Girard, 1996; Lamme et al., 1998c;
Hupe´, James, Payne, Lomber, Girard & Bullier, 1998).
This suggests that the late onset modulations observed
in prefrontal cortex and in V1, which both relate to
whether stimuli are perceived or not, strongly interde-
pend. Obviously the many visual and sensorimotor
areas in between these two extreme ‘ends’ of the brain
will be involved as well, as is shown by the many
findings of correlates of subjective perception in the
extrastriate areas (Logothetis & Schall, 1989; Leopold
& Logothetis, 1996; Britten, Newsome, Shadlen, Cele-
brini & Movshon, 1996; Bradley et al., 1998). Many
theories of visual awareness propose a general ‘state’ of
activity that involves many areas of the brain simulta-
neously, and that is achieved by recurrent feedfor-
ward–feedback connections, the key feature of this
state being some sort of resonance (Pollen, 1999), or
reentry (Edelman, 1992). The combination of related
findings on V1 and frontal cortex provides evidence for
such models.
The fact that in V1, as well as in many other corticale
areas a percentage of the activity correlates with aware-
ness poses a difficult problem for the localizationist
approach to visual awareness. It is probably safe to say
that in all parts of the brain activity may be recorded
about events of which we are not aware. Similarly,
maybe in all areas of the brain, activity can be recorded
that is related to awareness. This makes it rather
difficult to draw a sharp line to demarcate areas that
belong to the neural substrate of visual awareness from
those that do not. One would have to set a rather
arbitrary threshold on the percentage of activity that
should be related to conscious events in order to in-
clude the area. Moreover, any such a threshold will
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probably include and exclude different areas, depending
on the stimulus or task that is used.
5. The role of V1 in the NCVA depends on how the
NCVA is mediated
When acknowledging the first four conclusions, it is
evident that the answer to the question whether V1
plays a role in visual awareness cannot be answered
before we know how visual awareness is mediated.
When awareness turns out to be mediated by some
specific cortical area or some specific set of cells, V1 will
not be part of such a correlate of awareness. Also when
the NCVA turns out to be synchrony (or synchronous
oscillations in some specific frequency range), V1 will
probably not be part of it. However, when the NCVA
will consist of modulations of firing rate, very much like
the neural correlate of visual attention, V1 will proba-
bly play as much a role as any other area of the brain.
The question how the NCVA is mediated should thus
logically precede the question where it is localized. As
long as we are as far removed from an answer to this
‘how’ question as we are today, excluding V1 from the
NCVA is premature and may in fact obscure the way
towards that answer.
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